

counter to Faysal's feeling that mediation should be conducted between the Saudi Government and the UAR.

III. Courses of Action

A. It is essential that mediation be initiated immediately.

B. Our first preference, but one we should not press on the SYG is to have Dr. Bunche proceed to Riyadh by the middle of this week with full authority to mediate.

C. If the SYG is not prepared to send Dr. Bunche to the area in the course of this week, we should be prepared to ask Ambassador Bunker to return to the area by mid-week as the United States emissary. In so doing, we would be in the position of meeting the SYG's second requirement, i.e., trying out our eight points on the UAR and YAR. Appropriate consultations would be held with the SYG by Ambassador Bunker before his departure.

D. Ambassador Bunker should have the authority in his discretion to seek Faysal's private assurance that he will suspend aid to the Royalists, during the period of mediation, against Nasser's agreement to avoid any hostile actions against Saudi Arabia. Should Ambassador Bunker decide to exercise his discretionary authority, he must have the further power to promise dispatch of the air squadron shortly after Faysal's agreement to suspend, provided such a promise is necessary to achievement of the desired results.

E. Otherwise, the air squadron should be dispatched simultaneously with Faysal's agreement to disengage and Nasser's agreement to begin troop withdrawal. Its primary mission would be to reassure the Saudis and deter UAR attack against Saudi territory; ostensibly it would be there on a training mission to accelerate development of a Saudi air defense capability.

F. If Ambassador Bunker returns to the Near East pursuant to C above, he should seek to carry the mediation either to conclusion or to the point where it can be brought to a successful conclusion by the UN.